Analytic atheism : A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon?
|Druh||Článek v odborném periodiku|
|Časopis / Zdroj||Judgment and Decision Making|
|Fakulta / Pracoviště MU|
|Klíčová slova||atheism; cultural learning; dual process cognition; religious cognition; replicability; WEIRD people; culture|
|Popis||Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs.|