Truth and Science
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2014 |
| Druh | Další prezentace na konferencích |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | There has been a long struggle between many philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers over science as a provider of truths about the world. The answers to this question seems to depend more on one's conviction than on science or truth itself. Maybe there is no solution and maybe we should ask from a different perspective: Do we need truth in science? To put it more clear: Do we need truth in science from the perspective of theory of science? Do we need truth for description of scientific theories, their evaluation or scientific practice? I believe that from this perspective we can more simply evaluate the benefits or count the cost of conception of truth in science. We can revise our theories of science and see if it is necessary or worthy to have such a concept there. In a presented talk I will argue against it. My position will be that any conception of truth is not needed in science. I will present three arguments supporting this proposition. First argument will be connected to a process of falsification as the most famous description of science. I will show that in this process there is no place for truth. Secondly, I will argue that science is better off without involving the conceptions of truth even in a practice. This will be presented on a problem of scientific misconducts, which is more than acute and currently there are debates over the definition of these misconducts and possibilities of their detection. Last argument will demonstrate the problems made by considering something as truth which is unchangeable in a theory of science or in scientific theories. This does not mean that we should reject science or concept of truth. These arguments should justify the position that science can be described and can be functional without the necessity of being true, without the concept of truth. |
| Související projekty: |