Towards a More General Concept of Inference
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2014 |
| Druh | Článek v odborném periodiku |
| Časopis / Zdroj | Logica Universalis |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11787-014-0095-3 |
| Obor | Filosofie a náboženství |
| Klíčová slova | proof theory; inference; two-dimensional inference; 2D inference; inference rule; natural deduction; sequent calculus; Tichý; Frege |
| Popis | The main objective of this paper is to sketch unifying conceptual and formal framework for inference that is able to explain various proof techniques without implicitly changing the underlying notion of inference rules. We base this framework upon the so-called two-dimensional, i.e., deduction to deduction, account of inference introduced by Tichý in his seminal work The Foundations of Frege's Logic (1988). Consequently, it will be argued that sequent calculus provides suitable basis for such general concept of inference and therefore should not be seen just as technical tool, but philosophically well-founded system that can rival natural deduction in terms of its “naturalness”. |
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