It Ought To Be Therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of So-Called Moralistic Fallacy
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2017 |
| Druh | Další prezentace na konferencích |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | The problem of moralistic fallacy, crossing the gap from ought-propositions to is-propositions, is considered with regard to four questions: Should we consider all ought-propositions (or is-propositions) in same manner? Is the ought-is move an inference or is it just a case of some practical assumption? Is this move fallacious in any discussion? To address these questions we use the pragma-dialectical theory, where ought-is relation argumentatively as relation between propositions in reason and standpoint. |
| Související projekty: |