D-Conception of Inference (with an Examination ofParadoxical Reasoning)
| Autoři | |
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| Rok publikování | 2017 |
| Druh | Konferenční abstrakty |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | The talk presents an elaboration and several applications of Frege's and Tichý's two-dimensional (2D) conception of inference. In contrast to ordinary (1D) conception, each inferential step is a whole deduction and thus logical truth - not a single formula that need not to be logically valid (being mere hypothesis, assumption). 2D-conception is thus more satisfactory from an epistemological point of view. As shown by Tichý and Pezlar, reductio ad absurdum proofs cannot have a satisfactory explanation on 1D-conception. I show its 2D-explanation; similarly for indirect proofs. Moreover, a solution to the Paradox of Inference is offered. |
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