| Popis |
In my paper I will debate an influential neuroethical theory: the dual-process theory of moral judgment. I will briefly sketch its main ideas and present various sources of evidence for its two main contentions, namely that a utilitarian judgment is lead by a slow, reflective, deliberative cognitive process (System 2), whereas a deontological judgment is driven by a fast, automatic and emotion-based process (System 1). Then I will show that virtually all sources of evidence are in some way problematic. Moreover we have some evidence that utilitarian judgment is at least sometimes a result of automatic reactions (e.g. Kahane et al., 2012, Tremoliere, Bonnefon, 2014, Białek, De Neys, 2017) and there is also evidence that a deontological judgment could be led by deliberation (e.g. Moore, Clark, Kane, 2008, Kahane et al., 2012, Sylvia et al., 2013, Baron, Gürçay, 2017). We also have reasons to be cautious about the explanatory power of “trolleyological” methodological paradigms which the most studies employ. I conclude that the original strong contention of dual-process theory of moral judgment should be abandoned in favor of a much more fine-grained account. Afterwards I will argue that such a fine-grained alternative can be found in Ian McGilchrist's (2009) theory of brain asymmetry. I will sketch the differences between both hemispheres from the point of view of this theory and point out that the author assumes utilitarianism to be bound more with the modus operandi of the left hemisphere. I will show how the description of left-hemispheric functioning fits with concrete assertions from the point of view of dual-process theory about the sort of cognitive processes that back utilitarian thought. Then I will point to some specific neuroscientific evidence (eg. Moll et al., 2002, Knoch et al., 2006, Steckler et al., 2017) which supports the converging intuitions of McGilchrist and Greene. I will close with a suggestion to reevaluate the status of neuroscientific support for the utilitarian position.
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