The typing approach to Church-Fitch's knowability paradox and its revenge form
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2018 |
| Druh | Článek v odborném periodiku |
| Časopis / Zdroj | Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| www | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/311034 |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.26362/20180202 |
| Klíčová slova | Church-Fitch's knowability paradox; revenge paradox; type theory; typing |
| Popis | Williamson, Linsky, Paseau and others proposed a solution to Church- Fitch's knowability paradox that is based on typing knowledge; however, it received some criticism. Carrara and Fassio objected that the approach has no paradox-independent motivation, it is thus ad hoc. In the first part of the paper, I dismiss such criticism by carefully stating typing approach principles that are based on non-circular formation of propositions and intensional operators operating on them. In the second part of the paper, I demonstrate that the firm foundation of the approach prevents the variants of the paradox by Florio, Murzi and Jago that were developed as allegedly unresolvable by typing knowledge. The revenge form of Church-Fitch's knowability paradox, which had been proposed by Williamson, Hart, Carrara and Fassio, fares badly as well, since it is likewise based on violation of reasonable typing rules. |
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