How Can Mathematical Objects Be Real but Mind-Dependent?
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2022 |
| Druh | Článek ve sborníku |
| Konference | PLATONISM: Contributions of the 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Klíčová slova | abstract objects, access problem, platonism, philosophy of mathematics |
| Popis | Taking mathematics as a language based on empirical experience, I argue for an account of mathematics in which its objects are abstracta that describe and communicate the structure of reality based on some of our ancestral interactions with their environment. I argue that mathematics as a language is mostly invented. Nonetheless, in being a general description of reality it cannot be said that it is fictional; and as an intersubjective reality, mathematical objects can exist independent of any one person’s mind. |
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