Limits of Commitments: The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2024 |
| Druh | Článek v odborném periodiku |
| Časopis / Zdroj | Disputatio |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| www | https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002 |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002 |
| Klíčová slova | Brandom; game of giving and asking for reasons; inferentialism; interpretation; scorekeeping |
| Popis | In this paper, I examine Brandom’s notion of a de re reading of a tradition and question its legitimacy under certain circumstances. Specifically, I argue that within the language game of giving and asking for reasons, commitments should be ascribed to the utterer within reasonable limits, with the utterer only responsible for intentional or negligent breaches of duty. Even if we were to include an ideal speaker who knows all facts available at the time of her utterance, she cannot be held accountable for ignorance of things that do not yet exist. Therefore, I further argue that the time of the utterance must be taken into consideration when ascribing commitments and keeping score in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This temporal aspect is suppressed by Brandom’s notion of de re reading for pragmatic reasons, as he seeks to tell an inferentialist story of the philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, I argue that legitimacy poses a problem even for this approach because Brandom formulates his account in terms of rules, responsibility and sanctions. I offer a critical perspective on Brandom’s de re reading and the broader implications of his inferentialist framework. |
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