Points of View from a Logical Perspective II.
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2007 |
| Druh | Článek v odborném periodiku |
| Časopis / Zdroj | Organon F |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Obor | Filosofie a náboženství |
| Klíčová slova | points of view; transparanet intensional logic |
| Popis | In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P (simpliciter), because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: 'point of view' is a homonymous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term 'point of view'. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a (set of) evaluating proposition(s) about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent's attitude to the respective object. |
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