The Concept of Rule-following in the Philosophy of George Herbert Mead
| Název česky | K pojetí řízení se pravidlem ve filozofii George Herberta Meada |
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| Autoři | |
| Rok publikování | 2013 |
| Druh | Kapitola v knize |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | The goal of this presentation was to show how some of George Herbert Mead’s pragmatist ideas help us deal with the private language problem and the problem of rule-following, explicitly formulated in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, and further analyzed by thinkers like Kripke. In the first step, the significance of the private language problem is brought in, next it is shown how the concept of private language is connected to the notion of rule-following and finally, the Meadian solution is presented. The author defines three basic criteria of ascribing one's (linguistic) actions with the rule-following property (fallibility, consciousness, and normativity) and shows that these criteria are fully met in Mead's philosophy of language and mind with respect to his crucial notions like "taking the role of the other", "significant symbols" etc. The criterion by which one can tell apart those who follow rules and those who do not is eventually found in the concept of a "pragmatic test". |
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