The words matter - bribe or gift?

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Authors

FIŠAR Miloš

Year of publication 2014
Type Article in Proceedings
Conference New Economic Challenges – 5th International PhD Student Conference Conference Proceedings
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

Citation
Field Economy
Keywords corruption; economic experiment
Attached files
Description We performed a simplified corruption experiment which was based on experimental design by Lambsdorff & Frank (2011). In a simple ultimatum game two players act as public official and business manager. At first, the game is opened by decision of the manager what framing would be used in the game – he offers a bribe or gives a gift. Public official may then blow a whistle, take opportunistic or reciprocal action. In last stage of the game manager may report behavior of the public official. We carried out the experiment with student applicants and senior students of Public economics at the Faculty of Economics and Administration at Masaryk University in Czech Republic. In this paper we show that the subjects frame the game differently. But behave similarly in their actions (whistleblowing, opportunism, reciprocity).
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