Can we do without a metaphysical theory of personal identity in practice?
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2014 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=191537 |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | justification; metaphysics; personal identity; practical concerns |
| Description | In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit's theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard's claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston's contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these theories have a point, they do not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought. It is in these situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place. |
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