Reactions & Debate I: On Schechtman's Person Life View
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2014 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Ethical Perspectives |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/page.php?LAN=E&FILE=ep_detail&ID=198&TID=1776 |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/ER21.4.3062020 |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | personal identity; Person Life View; practical concerns; Schechtman |
| Description | In a recent book, Marya Schechtman argues that people are practical units whose identity is deeply interconnected with our various person-related practical concerns. The Person Life View she develops responds to a number of claims currently accepted by many scholars in the personal identity debate, including the claim that personal identity does not matter in the grounding of our person-related practical concerns, and the claim that individual practical concerns are justified by a number of different relations. Schechtman argues that personal identity does matter and that it grounds all our person-related practical concerns. I will argue that these conclusions are enabled by a series of redefinitions of established concepts made by Schechtman. I will make these redefinitions explicit. I will further argue that the Person Life View has implausible consequences both in personal ontology and in normative guidance. |
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