Strategické hlasování při volbách do Senátu Parlamentu České republiky
| Title in English | Strategic Voting in Elections to the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic |
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| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2015 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Evropská volební studia |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| web | http://volebnistudia.cz/wp-content/uploads/EVS_2015_1-1.pdf |
| Field | Political sciences |
| Keywords | two-round system; strategic voting; Duvergerian equilibrium; SF ratio; Senate |
| Description | The article deals with a concept of strategic voting employed in the case of the elections to the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The aim is to scrutinize whether a voter votes strategically in the two-round system in the Czech Republic. The area of study is analyzed through contradictory presuppositions of Garry Cox in Making Votes Count and Giovanni Sartori in Comparative Constitutional Engineering about a voters’ behavior in the first round of the two-round system. The results are that strategic voting is not observed. Hypothesis of Garry Cox about strategically acting voter was refuted by several employed tools. On the contrary hypothesis of Giovanni Sartori about elector voting in the first round of two-round system as freely as in proportional representation is in harmony with the results. Furthermore, on the one hand anti-system parties look to be underrepresented under the voting system in the Czech Republic, on the other hand they tend to gain more votes in the second from the two rounds as the results of the analysis of the related Sartori’s presuppositions. |
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