Based on what should we formulate a legitimate definition of quasi-logical arguments? Case study of arguments of reciprocity
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| Year of publication | 2016 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
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| Citation | |
| Description | The paper attempts to formulate an explicit definition of the so-called quasi-logical arguments, the phenomenon originally defined by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in the new rhetoric. The new rhetoric is widely criticized as a model that provides a vague definition of its categories leading to possible different understanding categories and subsequently to different results when the categories are used in the analysis. The paper offers a case study of a particular subtype of quasi-logical arguments, so-called arguments of reciprocity.The paper is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the sources of vagueness allowing different interpretations. The difference of interpretations is demonstrated by the analysis of three recent attempts to define arguments of reciprocity explicitly. The difference of interpretations raises the question of legitimacy of these interpretations given to the elements of the original category of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. It is desirable to provide such an interpretation, which corresponds to phenomena that were considered as falling under the original category.The second part is dedicated to the suggestion of definitional approach, which leads to a legitimate definition. As a suitable definitional approach seems to be an analysis of argumentative fragments from that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca proceeded in the formulation of their categories. In this paper, for the analysis of fragments is chosen the pragma-dialectical model of argumentation, which allows conceiving argumentative techniques functionally, in respect to the solution of conflict of opinion, and explores rhetorical strategies implemented by these techniques. The paper presents own definition of the phenomena falling under arguments of reciprocity. It grasps them as specific structural variations of argument schemes in the pragma-dialectical sense. |
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