Morální filosofie pro 21. století: Morální intuice jako ústřední koncept naturalizované etiky
| Title in English | Moral Philosophy for the 21st Century: Moral Intuition as a Key Concept of Naturalized Ethics |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2016 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | I will focus on the role of empirical methods and evolutionary models in one particular branch of philosophy – in moral philosophy. It will enable me to present my vision of this discipline for the 21st century – that is, my vision of ethics as a completely naturalized discipline and the research of morality as an interdisciplinary research project. In doing that I’ll focus on one particular moral phenomenon that I consider to be absolutely central for all levels of philosophical reflection of morality. This phenomenon is MORAL INTUITION or more generally any automatic/non-reflective/non-inferential processing of moral information. Over the last 15 years, this concept has become one of the most crucial terms in disciplines dedicated to the empirical study of morality – for example, in the second volume of influential series of edited volumes called Moral Psychology the word “intuition” is used more than 700 times. In moral psychology, this concept (and empirical phenomena that it’s referring to) is important, because it plays a key role in moral judgment. In experimental philosophy it’s also important, but this time mainly for the fact that we as moral philosophers depend on moral intuitions also in testing our theories – if theory has counterintuitive consequences, it’s seen as its defect and vice versa. Therefore, it seems that a moral philosopher working in the second decade of 21st century will sooner or later encounter this concept and will be forced to deal with it. In my talk, I’ll briefly introduce several branches of my research that have in common some appeal to intuitive processing of morality. Concretely, I’ll focus on following topics: ontology of moral intuitions (“What are moral intuitions?”), epistemology of moral intuitions (“Are they reliable source of moral knowledge?”), epidemiology of moral beliefs (“How they arise and change?”) and the relation of moral judgment and moral decision-making (“What is their role in moral behavior?”). |
| Related projects: |