Holá individua nejsou bez vlastností
| Title in English | Bare Individuals are not without Properties |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2008 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Organon F |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | bare individuals; antiessentialism; property; Tichý |
| Description | Proponents of the theory of bare individuals (like Tichý) claim an ontological thesis according to which any property of a certain kind an individual can ontologically lack. (Sometimes it is claimed an epistemological thesis that properties can be conceptually separated from an individual.) However, opponents of the theory disprove an ontological thesis according to which an individual ontologically lacks (or: it can lack) every property of a certain kind. Thus they wrongly attack the theory of nude individuals. Moreover, the theory of bare individuals is not compatible with the theory of nude individuals. For individuals (of the theory of bare individuals) instantiate pleiades of properties (including purely contingent ones). To support this I offer several arguments. |
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