Against Kolář's Criticism of Tichý's Bare Individuals
| Title in English | Against Kolář's Critique of Tichý's Bare Individuals |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2007 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Pro-Fil |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| web | http://profil.muni.cz/02_2007/raclavsky_against_kolars_criticism.pdf |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | bare individuals; bare particulars; properties; intensional logic; transparent intensional logic |
| Description | In the present paper it is defended Tichý's conception of bare individuals against criticism raised by Petr Kolář. Kolář's attempt was in fact misguided because in most of his definitions he construed bare individuals as individuals lacking (certain kind of) properties. However, from Tichý's repeated formulations it is clear enough that bare individuals are individuals such that for any contingent property the individual instantiates, it is possible to lack it. Thus in fact, Kolář criticized conception(s) which was completely not Tichý's own. We discuss also other reasons why Kolář's criticism is wrong. |
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