Rethinking the Modal Argument against Nominal Description Theory
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2008 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | modal argument; nominal description theory; singular terms |
| Description | According to the Nominal description theory (NDT), the meaning of a proper name is identical with the meaning of the so-called nominal description. Kripke-like argumentation against NDT by means of modal argument can be doubted because names are introduced by means of a contingent baptizing act. I suggest refinements of the modal argument which filter out such objection. I distinguish two kinds of nominal descriptions: rigid and non-rigid; thus there arise two versions of modal argument, which both are valid. But one of them has a conclusion (targeted against NDT) the truth of which remains disputable. The reformulation of Kripke's thesis I suggest is thus needed. |
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