Reformulating Tichý's Conception of Bare Individuals
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2008 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Organon F |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| web | https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=699652 |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | bare particulars; individuals; antiessentialism;properties; intensional logic |
| Description | A bare individual was conceived by Tichý as an individual such that if the property the individual instantiates is non-trivial (contingent), it is possible for the individual to lack it (and still be the same individual); and for any trivial property (i.e. property with constant extension) that it cannot lack this kind of property. The exact readings of Tichý's original formulations of bare individuals are subject to a detailed analysis to reveal that any of them is refutable by means of Cmorejian objection that there exist contingent properties which are partly essential (i.e. there exists an individual which cannot lack such property). To avoid such (valid) objection, the present paper attempts to rebuild Tichý's definitions into viable ones. |
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