Truth : An Explication in Transparent Intensional Logic
| Authors | |
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| Year of publication | 2012 |
| Type | Conference abstract |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | I suggest an explication of the notion "true" within the extensive logical framework of Pavel Tichý's Transparent intensional logic (TIL). The notion splits into three basic kinds accordingly to the range of their applicability, viz. to: a. propositions (which can be denotata of expressions), b. (so-called) constructions of propositions (which can be meanings of expressions-sentences), c. expressions. (Constructions are abstract structured entities akin to algorithms. They construct objects, e.g. propositions. Note the hyperintensional individuation of meanings in TIL. Propositions can be construed as facts.) Both notions of kind a. and b. are language independent. Truth of propositions (i.e. of classes of world-time couples) is rather transparent; truth of constructions is defined in terms of it. The notions of kind c. are relative to language; the relativity is either explicit, or implicit. Truth of expressions is defined in terms of truth of the expressions' meanings (denotata), thus truth of meanings (denotata) is primary. (Unlike usual approach, the explication does not depend on the notion of translation. On the other hand, it is suggested an explication of language.) For each kind, total and partial variants of the notions are distinguished. It is easy to show that the explication is immune to paradoxes. The explication confirms Tarski's undefinability theorem, though in a partly corrected form. |
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