Action representation and Theory of Mind
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2012 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | It was noted that ritual behavior can be understood and analytically accessed as a special case of ordinary action. Our interpretation of these actions seems to be driven by deeply rooted cognitive abilities that essentially allow a situation of religious ritual to be understood, conducted and eventually transmitted. The ability to rightly distinguish between ritual elements enable us to be competent in ritual action but it also brings in a cognitive demands. I will present a theoretical background and experimental research that may give us a certain understanding of relative cognitive costs related to representation and processing of ritual items. Does our ability to process information about social actors display a higher cognitive demand then representation of inanimate material objects? Is it the ontological status of ritual item and hence the type of representation we are holding of perceived ritual elements or rather mutual relations these ritual items hold between themselves that is burdensome to a human cognition? If we are able to rightly answer to these questions we may be able to draw a much finer predictions regarding the transmission and proliferation of religious movements and thus deepen our understanding of ends and beginnings of religion. |