Bostrom's Simulation Argument and The Indifference Principle
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| Year of publication | 2021 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
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| Description | In 2003, Nick Bostrom presented an argument that attempts to show that there are interesting empirical reasons for believing we are living in a computer simulation. His argumentation is based on the bayesian indifference principle - the idea that if the probability distribution according to which strategies are chosen is unknown, one should consider all strategies equal. I intend to show that this principle has further ramifications for Bostrom's argument, beyond those shown by Bostrom himself. My main points will be two - first, the vague concept of "historical simulations" is not tenable due to the indifference principle - I propose that there is no reason to believe that most simulated minds would be in ancestor simulations and therefore, there is little reason to believe we live in one. The second argument shows that extinction of a simulated civilization is made more probable by its increasing complexity because complexity creates drain on computational resources and invites outside intervention aimed at reducing said complexity, i.e. shutdown. This means that living in a civilization with growing complexity that is getting closer to the ability to make simulations of its own should reduce our belief that we are, indeed, living in a simulation. |
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