Pojem pravdivosti v lhářských paradoxech: Tichého řešení
| Title in English | The Concept of Truth in Liar's Paradoxes: Tichý's Solution |
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| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2009 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | Poznanie a prawda |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | Liar paradox; semantic paradoxes; truth; ramified hierarchy of types; Russell; Tarski; Tichý; transparent intensional logic |
| Description | Both first classical resolutions of Liar's paradoxes suffer from several disadvantages. Pavel Tichý's proposal can be characterized as a golden middle way combining Russell and Tarski but avoiding problematic points of their proposals. Any language L is construed as a function from expressions to (logically explicated) meanings. Since no function can be among its own values, 'L' (and expressions containing 'L') is meaningless in L. No sentence is true simpliciter but relatively to what it says in a given language. Then the Liar's sentence (with 'true in L') is clearly meaningless (thus it cannot be true or false). |
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