Lhářský paradox, význam a pravdivost
| Title in English | Liar Paradox, Meaning and Truth |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2009 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Filosofický časopis |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | liar paradox; semantic paradoxes; theory of truth; Tichý; transparent intensional logic |
| Description | Tichý's solved three basic kinds of Liar within his ramified theory of types which is inspired by Russell's original one. He used it for explication of language and the result seems similar to Tarski's hierarchy of languages. Unlike Russell and Tarski, Tichý's proposed variosu reasons for hierarchies. Any language L is construed as mapping from expressions to meanings. For no function is allowed to be among its own values, the name of language L, i.e. 'L' (and then any other expression containing 'L'), is thus meaningless in L ('L' is meaningful only in metalanguage ML). Any sentence is true relative to what it means in a given language. Disambiguated liar sentence contains 'truth in L', thus it is clearly meaningless in L. Since meaningless sentence cannot be true or false, the liar paradox cannot arise. After detail exposition and mainly large defense of Tichý's approach, we applied successfully the method of his solution to other known kinds of liar paradox. |
| Related projects: |