On the Idea of Analysis in the Late Wittgenstein
| Authors | |
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| Year of publication | 2012 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Papers of the 35th International Wittgenstein Symposium |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | Wittgenstein; cause; reason; internal relations |
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| Description | Wittgenstein is committed to the idea of analysis in the Tractatus. His logical analysis aims to reveal a hidden form of the proposition in terms of ultimate elements and their mutual logical relations. Wittgenstein abandoned this metaphysical commitment in his late philosophy. The aim of this paper is to show that Wittgenstein put forward a restricted idea of analysis throughout his philosophical writings. This idea relies on two theoretical distinctions. The first is that between cause and reason and the second between external and internal relations. I shall argue that the former distinction is a special case of the latter and so, for our purposes, we can take it as one fundamental difference. This difference might be confused in the surface grammar. The aim of Wittgenstein's analysis is to reveal the difference. Finally, I will indicate some philosophical problems that can be surmounted using this difference. |
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