The Modal Argument against Nominal Description Theory
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Rok publikování | 2017 |
Druh | Článek v odborném periodiku |
Časopis / Zdroj | Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy |
Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
Citace | |
www | https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2017-310106 |
Obor | Filosofie a náboženství |
Klíčová slova | Nominal Description Theory; modal argument; Millianism |
Popis | The paper examines Loar’s and Bach’s defence of Nominal Description Theory against Kripkean Modal Argument (MA). Using formal tools of hyperintensional logic, I discriminate three kinds of nominal description which are possible substitutes for a proper name, thus considering various readings of the MA. On its natural understanding, the MA is valid – contrary to what Loar and Bach say. On the other hand, the soundness of the MA remains doubtful, as pointed out already by Loar and Bach. |
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